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Abstract
This paper uncovers evidence of a potentially important channel linking financial
development to growth: the financing of innovations introduced by entrepreneurs. Us-
ing internationally comparable data on European countries, entry and exit in research-
intensive industries are found to be disproportionately sensitive to the level of financial
development. Furthermore, financial development is related to increased R&D spend-
ing. The results are robust to several diﬀerent measures of financial development, and
are supported by surveys of the sources of finance used by entrepreneurs. The evi-
dence suggests that intellectual property rights provide the institutional underpinning
for financial markets to direct funds towards innovative entrepreneurs.
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“The banker [. . . ] is essentially a phenomenon of development [. . . ] he makes
possible the carrying out of new combinations [of productive means], authorises
people, in the name of society as it were, to form them.”
Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (1934).
1 Introduction
An important motor of economic growth is thought to be the introduction of innovations
(new or improved products or processes) by entrepreneurs, fuelled by resources provided to
them by financial markets.1 However, an empirical link between finance, entry and innovative
activity has proved elusive. Since the institutions that underpin financial development vary
significantly across countries, but only gradually over time, uncovering this link requires
internationally comparable data. This paper aims to link financial development to entry
and innovation using comprehensive, internationally-comparable data on entry, exit and
innovation expenditures, gathered by the European Union.
Key to the empirical strategy in this paper is industry variation. Industry data provide
a natural environment in which to search for evidence of a link between financial develop-
ment and innovative entry. Cohen, Levin and Mowery (1987) and Ilyina and Samaniego
(2008) find persistent diﬀerences across industries in R&D intensity,2 and Aghion, Fally and
Scarpetta (2007) demonstrate the sensitivity of industry entry rates to measures of finan-
cial development. If financial development enables costly innovation by entrepreneurs, we
would expect financial underdevelopment to be related to reductions in entry primarily in
research-intensive industries. Moreover, if financial markets improve the allocation of re-
sources across firms by directing capital towards innovative entrepreneurs, we would expect
to see disproportionate reductions in exit rates in such industries as well.
1This view is often traced back to Schumpeter (1934) as in the epigraph of this paper. Morales (2003)
and Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) develop models of growth through "creative destruction"
fuelled by financial markets.
2This is not to say that R&D activity does not also vary significantly within industries: see Klette and
Kortum (2004) for an extensive analysis.
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The paper measures research intensity using data on publicly traded firms in the United
States. In normal times, a typical such firm arguably does not experience significant financial
constraints on its ability to finance profitable projects, so its propensity to conduct research
should be representative of the technological opportunities for research open to firms in the
industry. Industry variation in rates of entry and exit across European countries can then be
exploited to identify whether financial development stimulates entrepreneurship and innov-
ative activity particularly in industries that have a greater propensity to conduct research.
Also, using comprehensive survey data from the European Union, I examine whether finan-
cial development is related to diﬃculty in raising external funds for entry and innovation.
The data are based on the universe of legal firms and (unlike most previous studies of firm
demographics3) cover both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries.
I find that, in countries with greater financial development, rates of entry are higher in in-
dustries with greater research-intensity, supporting the hypothesis of a link between finance,
innovation and entrepreneurship. Moreover, the rate of exit is also disproportionately higher
in such industries. Thus, the availability of finance increases competitive pressure on incum-
bents, and this occurs mainly in research-intensive industries. These findings are consistent
with the notion that the entry of new firms and the displacement of incumbents together
form part of a process of "creative destruction," and that the availability of finance plays a
critical role in enabling that process. The results are robust to diﬀerent measures of financial
development, including measures of financial deepening, measures of the eﬃciency of finan-
cial markets, and survey-based measures of the availability and sophistication of financial
markets.
The paper also finds that financial development disproportionately aﬀects spending on
innovation in research-intensive industries, so that innovative (as well as entrepreneurial)
activity is hampered by financial underdevelopment. Thus, financial development does not
merely reallocate innovative activity between entrants and incumbents. Indeed, in a com-
3Exceptions include Brandt (2004) and Samaniego (2010), who also use Eurostat entry and exit data but
do not look at innovation nor startup survey data.
3
prehensive survey of startups across Europe, I find that financial development is negatively
related to the share of firms that report diﬃculty in raising external funds as a significant
obstacle to innovation.
The importance of financing constraints for research activity raises questions about the
role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in supporting financial development. The output of
R&D is generally thought of as being non-rival and (in the absence of IPRs) non-excludable
— see Romer (1990). As a result IPRs are thought to be among the institutions that underpin
financial development, since an entrepreneur with a protected idea is less likely to lose the
rights to the project through imitation by firms who do not incur the full R&D cost. See
Claessens and Laeven (2003) and Biasi and Perotti (2008). Thus, the ability to own (and
voluntarily transfer) ideas may make it easier for entrepreneurs to raise external funds in the
first place. We explore whether IPRs underpin financial development by using measures of
IPR protection, including interactions of IPRs with R&D intensity in the industry regres-
sions. We find that an interaction of R&D intensity and IPR protection outperforms the
interaction of R&D intensity and financial development. This could explain why R&D inten-
sive industries are not necessarily industries with high rates of entry and exit in financially
developed economies: to the extent that these are also economies with strong IPRs, the in-
ventor and the developer need not be the same person as the idea could be easily transferred
to whoever is most capable (financially or otherwise) of realizing the idea, as suggested by
Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). Furthermore, we find that IPR protection disproportionately
increases growth in R&D intensive industries. All this indicates that financial development
encourages growth by channeling funds towards innovations introduced by entrepreneurs.
An early debate on the economic role of entrepreneurs can be traced back to Knight
and Schumpeter — see Evans and Jovanovic (1989) for a discussion. Knight (1921) viewed
entrepreneurs as being self-financed, perhaps assuming committment or asymmetric infor-
mation problems inherent to financial transactions. On the other hand, Schumpeter believed
that the banking sector would adequately channel funds from those who had them towards
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entrepreneurs who might lack them. An interpretation of the results of this paper is that the
Schumpeterian view is more appropriate for financially developed environments,4 whereas
the Knightian view is adequate for financially underdeveloped environments. Moreover,
variation in financial development appears linked to variation in IPR protection.
The paper fits between an extensive literature on financial development and the literature
on the determinants of entry and exit. Numerous studies including King and Levine (1993),
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) examine the impact
of financial development on growth. However, in spite of the importance for innovation
often attributed to the financing of entrepreneurs, direct evidence of this channel of growth
is lacking. The sense that there should be a link between technical change, entry and exit
goes back at least as far as Schumpeter (1934), and Geroski (1989), Audretsch (1991) and
others study the link empirically. However, none of these papers studies the role of finance
in the process of entry and exit, nor the impact of finance on innovative activity. Carlin and
Meyer (2003) document a sensitivity of research spending to the financial environment, and
the survey of Hall (2005) on the financing of innovation devotes a section to innovation at
startups, but neither discusses entry and exit rates themselves, and neither looks at industry
diﬀerences.
Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009) study the 1990s R&D boom for evidence of a causal
link from finance to R&D spending, finding a significant influence of the availability of equity
finance and cash flow on R&D at young (but not at mature) firms. In the current paper, the
use of a country-industry panel (instead of a time-firm panel) provides strong confirmation
of their results, as well as allowing us to focus specifically on the entry (and exit) of firms.
Claessens and Laeven (2003) find that property rights (including intellectual property rights)
appear to be an important institutional underpinning for financial development, enhancing
growth through improvements in resource allocation. The present paper finds evidence for
4Hurst and Lusardi (2004) also conclude that "even if some households that want to start small businesses
are currently constrained in their borrowing, such constraints are not empirically important in deterring the
majority of small business formation in the United States."
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one channel through which this might occur: the replacement of incumbents by innovative
entrants.
A closely related paper is Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta (2007), who ask whether entry is
especially sensitive to financial development in industries where firms are more dependent
on external finance. We find that external finance dependence and research intensity are
positively linked, and show that similar results for finance dependence can be derived as for
R&D intensity: however, the results concerning R&D intensity are more robust in a variety
of ways, consistent with the proposition in Hall (2005) and Ilyina and Samaniego (2008,
2009) that finance dependence results in part from the need to raise funds for research, and
that R&D intensive industries not only have a greater need for external finance but also a
lower ability to raise it in a financially underdeveloped environment.
Klapper et al (2006) argue that the regulation of entry suppresses entry. I also show that
these results are not simply due to a negative correlation between financial development and
institutional entry costs — although, interestingly, entry costs have similar impact as financial
underdevelopment. This could be because, for a given level of financial development (ability
to raise funds), high entry costs raise the need for entrepreneurs to raise funds initially.
Nonetheless, the impact of entry costs disappears once we condition for intellectual property
rights.
Section 2 discusses the data to be used in the paper. Section 3 provides motivating
evidence of a link between financial development and constraints on the activity of entre-
preneurs and of innovators, based on European survey data. Section 4 reports the results
concerning financial development and industry entry, exit and innovation spending. Section
5 concludes by discussing the link between these findings and theories of innovation and IPR
enforcement.
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2 Data
2.1 Data on Industry-country pairs
2.1.1 Entry and exit
Rates of entry, exit and turnover are drawn from the Eurostat Business Demography data-
base, as are data on industry expenditures on innovation. The data cover 28 countries over
the period 1997−2006. Eurostat reports data gathered by the national statistical agencies of
the member countries of the European Union concerning the universe of "enterprises" in the
business register, following a common methodology.5 Thus, the data are comprehensive and
internationally comparable. Entering the business register is required to legally produce and
sell goods and services. If an enterprise ceases operations, by law it must notify the business
register within a matter of months. Mergers and changes of legal form are not counted as
entry, nor are temporary shut-downs counted as exit. Thus, the data should adequately
reflect entry and exit rates in the formal sector of each country. As well as coverage and
comparability, an advantage of using European data is that the relatively skilled workforces
of European economies, along with the cross-border mobility of labor and goods, imply that
bottlenecks experienced by would-be entrepreneurs are not likely to be driven by the lack of
existence or availability of certain skills or resources, but rather by the inability to acquire
them, for example due to financial constraints.
We study the same 41 industries as Samaniego (2010).6 This includes 15 manufacturing
industries and 26 non-manufacturing industries. Thus, the results of this paper provide a
comprehensive view of the impact of financial institutions on entrepreneurship and innovation
across the economy. Most other studies of entry or innovation focus on manufacturing (e.g.
5An "enterprise" is similar to the US Census Bureau definition of a "firm", except that mergers and
changes of legal status are distinguished from "true" entries and exits. The included countries are all those
that reported to Eurostat at the time of the study: participation in the data collection exercise was not
mandatory so that, for example, some countries report entry data but not innovation data.
6Samaniego (2010) contains additional details regarding the construction of the Eurostat entry and exit
data, but uses an earlier edition of Eurostat with fewer countries does not look at financing nor innovation
data.
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Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) and Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta (2007)), which
accounts for less than half of employment and GDP in most countries.
For industry j in country c, the variable Entryj,c is the proportion of enterprises active
at a given date t that entered since date t − 1, and the variable Exitj,c is the number of
enterprises that closed between t−1 and t, divided by the number of establishments active at
date t. The variable Turnoverj,c is the sum of these two variables. All of these are average
rates over the sample period for each country-industry pair, to abstract from short term
conditions and from possible delays in the reporting of entry and exit.7 Since the concept of
creative destruction is related to both entry and exit, for much of the paper we will focus on
the variable Turnoverj,c, but also check that results are robust to considering Entryj,c and
Exitj,c separately.
For most of the paper, we use turnover, entry and exit for each industry-country pair.
However, for cross-sectional comparisons, the industry index of entry, exit or turnover is
based on the industry fixed eﬀect in a regression of country and industry dummy variables.
For example, if yj,c is entry in industry j in country c, we estimate:
yj,c = αc + δj + εj,c (1)
where αc and δj are country and industry dummy variables. The index of entry for industry
j is then the coeﬃcient δj, added to the coeﬃcient αc for the median country. See Tables 1
and 2 for summary statistics at the country and industry level.
2.1.2 Innovation expenditures
Innovation expenditures are based on the European Community Innovation Survey IV, 2002-
2005, which was conducted by the European Commission and which is also available through
7In practice these are likely to be short: for example, in the UK enterprises are removed from the business
register three months after the register is notified of their closure.) Individual country registration rules may
be found at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/sbs_base_an2.htm
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Eurostat.8 The survey reports expenditure on innovation as a share of net sales over the
period. The survey defines an innovation as:
"a new or significantly improved product (good or service) introduced to the
market or the introduction within an enterprise of a new or significantly improved
process. Innovations are based on the results of new technological developments,
new combinations of existing technology or the utilization of other knowledge
acquired by the enterprise. Innovations may be developed by the innovating
enterprise or by another enterprise. However, purely selling innovations wholly
produced and developed by other enterprises is not included as an innovation
activity. Innovations should be new to the enterprise concerned. For product
innovations they do not necessarily have to be new to the market and for process
innovations the enterprise does not necessarily have to be the first one to have
introduced the process."
The sampling population included all enterprises with 10 or more employees, as well as
many smaller enterprises. Responding firms comprised 45 percent of the universe of firms
in the business registries. The survey covers a sample of 181,838 firms. Eurostat reports
industry innovation expenditures across enterprises that reported some innovation, which is
about 40 percent of responding firms, varying somewhat across countries.
I construct two measures of R&D spending. One is the ratio of innovation expenditures
to sales reported in Eurostat for industry j in country c, called InnovRAWj,c . As mentioned,
this "raw" data only covers innovating firms. The other measure is InnovRAWj,c multiplied by
the share of innovators in each country, which we call InnovADJj,c .
8Eurostat suggests that the sampling methodology of earlier surveys may not have been uniform across
countries.
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2.1.3 Industry growth
Eurostat also reports value-added growth gj,c for each industry-country pair. This is the
meaure of growth used in Rajan and Zingales (1998) to study the interaction between external
finance dependence and financial development. Again, we measure it using the average over
the period 1997− 2006.
2.2 Survey data
I also employ the Eurostat Factors of Business Success survey, to get a sense of the impact
of financial factors on entrepreneurship as perceived by entrepreneurs themselves. While
survey results are not available at the industry level, they are useful for painting an overall
picture of the link between finance and innovative activity at startups. The survey covers
entrepreneurs responsible for births registered in 2002 that survived to 2005. Data were
gathered in 2005, and cover 338,462 diﬀerent firms across Europe.
2.3 Data on Industry Characteristics
2.3.1 Research intensity
In what follows, R&D intensity will be regarded as an industry characteristic. This is in
line with Cohen et al (1987), who find that industry dummies account for over half of the
variation in research intensity across firms in their sample, and Ilyina and Samaniego (2008)
who find that the industry ranking by R&D intensity is stable across decades.
We require an indicator of the "technological" aspect of research intensity in an industry.
The ideal indicator should not be contaminated by, in particular, financing constraints. We
draw on data on publicly traded US firms. The presumption is that these firms operate in
highly liquid capital markets, so any constraints on profitable investment projects should
be minimal, except perhaps in times of crisis — see Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Ilyina
and Samaniego (2008). As a result, the R&D activity of a typical firm drawn from this
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environment should adequately reflect the technological tendency of firms to perform R&D
in that firm’s industry.
R&D intensity at the firm level is defined as R&D expenditures divided by value added
(DATA 46 divided by DATA 12 in Compustat). This is as in Carlin and Meyer (2003). For
each firm, I add the numerator and the denominator over the years 1997-2006. The industry
measure is the median firm value, which we call RNDj.9
Table 2 reports that the distribution of RNDj is quite skewed. As a result, in the
multivariate regressions that follow we correct all standard errors for heteroskedasticity by
industry (and country), and later check the robustness of results by bootstrapping, among
other methods.
2.3.2 External finance dependence
External finance dependence (EFDj) is measured as in Rajan and Zingales (1998), using
the share of capital expenditures that is not financed by cash flow from operations. Capital
expenditures correspond to DATA 128 in Compustat. Cash flow from operations is defined
as cash flow from operations plus changes in payables minus changes in receivables plus
changes in inventories, and is computed using DATA 110 and DATA 2, 3 and 70, or DATA
302, 303 and 304 if unavailable. Both capital expenditures and cash flow are summed up
over the period 1997 − 2006 to compute the firm-level EFDj measures. The industry-level
measure is the EFD of the median firm.
Tables 1 and 2 report the overall pattern of entry and exit rates across countries and
industries. The cross country mean rate of turnover (and the mean across country-industry
observations) is 17.5 percent. The cross country standard deviation is 4.8 percent, whereas
across industry averages observations it is 4.4 percent. Thus there is roughly as much vari-
ation across countries as there is across industries.
9We do not use the CIS IV data to construct measures of "fundamental" industry tendency to perform
R&D. The main reason is that (as discussed later) these numbers do not represent a "clean" measure of
the technological requirement for research, since financing constraints in diﬀerent countries may aﬀect their
innovation spending. In addition, the innovation measures are not available for some service sector industries.
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Table 3 reports that entry, exit and turnover are very highly correlated across industries,
as known since Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) reported this finding for Manufactur-
ing. On the other hand, the correlation between RNDj and turnover is negligible. Thus,
R&D intensity does not appear related to entry and exit rates per se. This implies that any
interaction between R&D and finance leading to diﬀerences in turnover should not be due
simply to the fact that R&D is itself a determinant of turnover, but rather due to the impact
of financial factors on the ability of firms to conduct business or pursue R&D.
Table 3 shows that EFDj is very highly correlated with RNDj (although not with
turnover). Thus, to avoid omitted variable bias, we estimate our regressions below replacing
RNDj with EFDj. If results are stronger for EFDj than for RNDj, this indicates that it is
the need for finance (regardless of the purpose) that interacts with financial development. If
results are stronger for RNDj than for EFDj, this indicates that it is specifically (or primar-
ily) problems that arise in the financing of R&D that interact with financial development.10
TABLES 1− 4 ABOUT HERE
2.4 Data on Countries
2.4.1 Financial Development
According to Levine (2005), financial institutions arise to ameliorate market frictions, lower-
ing transaction costs and generating or distributing information. The functions of financial
institutions are to produce information, allocate capital, monitor investments, allocate risk,
pool savings and ease the exchange of goods and services. As a result, financial institutions
naturally aﬀect the allocation of resources across activities and macroeconomic outcomes.
Financial development is defined as an amelioration (although not necessarily elimination)
of the eﬀects of information, enforcement and transactions costs, provided by financial in-
10Samaniego (2010) finds a strong link between turnover and investment-specific technical change (ISTC).
However, the correlation between R&D intensity and ISTC as measured in that paper turns out to be only
0.064. Thus, omitted variable bias from ISTC should not be a concern.
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struments, markets and intermediaries.
Building on this definition, I employ six diﬀerentmeasures of financial development.
Using six diﬀerent measures of financial development, measured in very diﬀerent ways, adds
considerable robustness to the results. All of the measures are positively correlated with
each other — see Table 4.
The prototypical measure of financial development is financial deepening, which is used in
King and Levine (1993) and Rajan and Zingales (1998), among others. Deepening is thought
of as indicating development because a larger financial sector indicates a larger number of
transactions that are more eﬃciently dealt with by financial institutions than by dealing
directly with the "untreated" transaction costs (or simply avoided).
A second class includes measures of financial development that are based on observed
outcomes, but are not directly related to financial deepening. Instead, they indicate other
aspects of the the productivity or eﬃciency of financial intermediaries.
A third class of measures of financial development is based on surveys of executives,
which ask regarding the nature and availability of financial services. As such, these may be
the broadest measures of the six.
Specifically, the measures are defined as follows.
1. CREc: Our benchmark measure uses the domestic private credit-to-GDP ratio. The
presumption is that financial deepening is the outcome of financial development, as
in King and Levine (1993). Domestic credit data come from the IMF International
Financial Statistics (IFS) (domestic credit allocated to the private sector is IFS line
32d). It is measured at the beginning of the period for which we have industry data
(1997) or else the earliest year in the period for which it is available.
2. CAPc: For robustness I also use the domestic capitalization-to-GDP ratio, the sum of
domestic market capitalization and private credit. Although CAP is broader than CRE,
it may not always accurately reflect the amount of funds raised in domestic financial
markets for productive activities (due to tax incentives to list on stock exchanges,
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stock market dynamics being driven by factors other than fundamentals, etc.). Such
distortions likely to be particularly severe for the case of transition economies. Hence,
in what follows we use CREc as our benchmark. Market capitalization is reported in
Eurostat. It is measured at the beginning of the period for which we have industry
data (1997) or else the earliest year in the period for which it is available.
3. BANKc: We also use a measure of bank overhead as a share of assets in 1997. This is
an inverse indicator of financial development (see Beck et al (2000)), as high overhead
represents ineﬃciency in the financial sector. Hence, we multiply it by minus one.
It is drawn from the 2006 update of the Beck et al (2000) Database on Financial
Development and Structure.
4. MARGc: The interest rate margin is also an inverse indicator of financial development.
The presumption is that high margins reflect high costs of operation, or an uncompet-
itive banking sector. We draw it from the same source as BANKc, and also multiply
it by minus one.
5. ACCSc: We also use some survey-based measures. The World Economic Forum Global
Competitiveness Report (GCR) contains a measure of "loan access". It is based on the
survey question "how easy is it to obtain a bank loan with a good business plan and
no collateral?" on a scale of 1-7. The question was included in the Executive Opinion
Survey, which covers over 12,000 executives in 134 countries. See Browne et al (2007)
for more details.
6. SOPHc: The GCR also contains a measure of financial market sophistication. It
grades responses to the question "the level of sophistication of financial markets in your
country is (1=lower than international norms, 7=higher than international norms)."
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3 Preliminary evidence: Survey results
To motivate the more detailed industry-level analysis in Section 4, we begin by examining
the results of Europe-wide surveys of startups and of innovators. This is to examine broad
evidence of financing constraints facing entrepreneurs and innovators.
An indication of the role of diﬀerent sources of finance in entrepreneurship can be obtained
from the Factors of Business Success Survey (FBS). In addition, the Community Innovation
Survey IV (CIS) sheds some light on the diﬃculties suﬀered by innovating firms.
Figure 1 reports the sources of financing tapped by entrepreneurs in the FBS survey.
Figure 1 also relates these sources to the private credit/GDP ratio (CRE), a conventional
measure of financial development. It is notable that the entrepreneur’s own resources are a
significant source of funds in all countries. At the same time, variation in this dimension
is not clearly related to financial deepening. This suggests that, in all places, entrepreneurs
generally exhaust their own resources and have to seek funds from external sources. Interest-
ingly, while some authors ascribe a central role to venture capital in entrepreneurial activity
in certain industries (for example Hellmann and Puri (2000)), according to the FBS survey
venture capital is not in general a significant source of funds for new firms.
Two sources of external funds are quantitatively important, both because they are wide-
spread and because variation in the importance of these sources is linked to financial devel-
opment. These sources are family assistance and bank loans with collateral. The two are
significantly negatively correlated with each other (−64 percent, P-value 1 percent). More-
over, the extent to which entrepreneurs rely on family for external funds is negatively related
to financial development and, while there are several alternatives for them to seek, the main
alternative seems to be bank loans with collateral (Table 5). Thus, financial development
allows entrepreneurs to tap new (formal) sources of external finance that would otherwise
be limited.
TABLES 5− 7, FIGURES 1− 2 ABOUT HERE
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Two further questions on the survey are useful for determining whether financial devel-
opment is critical for entrants and, in particular, whether it is critical for innovation by
entrants. One is the answer to the question "Is the highest priority if earnings increase to
pay oﬀ loans or credit?" The share of startups responding "yes" to this question is positively
related to the level of financial development — indicating that in financially underdeveloped
environments startups may often simply not have access to loans, or that firms tend to enter
industries that depend less of external finance (such as less R&D intensive industries). An-
other is the answer to the question "Was the motivation for the start-up to realize an idea
for an new product or service?" The share of startups responding "yes" to this question is
positively related to financial development — in spite of the possibility of selection eﬀects.
See Table 6.
The CIS Survey asks firms what kind of factors severely hamper innovation. Financially
developed economies appear much less likely to report the lack of external financing as
a diﬃculty — see Figure 2 and Table 7. Tellingly, they also appear less likely to report
dominance by "established enterprises" as a factor discouraging innovation, consistent with
the idea that financial development stimulates competition by facilitating innovation by
entrepreneurs. They also report diﬃculty finding partners for innovation, suggesting either
the unwillingness of established enterprises to cooperate with competitors or, perhaps, that
in underdeveloped financial markets property rights enforcement is weak, making it hard for
firms to trust each other with joint control of an intangible asset — see Gans et al (2002). Biais
and Perotti (2008) develop a theory whereby successful entepreneurship requires evaulation
of the entrepreneur’s "idea" by several other agents (including financiers), each of whom
may try to steal the idea, and their model is consistent with this finding.
This discussion suggests that financial development is important for financing new en-
terprises, but also for facilitating innovation, particularly at new firms. In what follows,
we exploit cross-industry variation in observed entry and exit rates, as well as innovation
spending, to further substantiate this link.
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4 Country-industry results
4.1 Entry, exit and financial development
We wish to ask whether, in financially underdeveloped economies, creative destruction is
suppressed particularly in industries that are research-intensive. To test for this pattern, I
adopt the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Let yj,c
be the dependent variable for industry j in country c. Dependent variables include turnover
measures and innovation expenditure measures — but, for concreteness, let us assume it is
the rate of entry. Let αc and δj denote country and industry indicator variables, respectively.
RNDj measures R&D intensity in industry j, and FDc measures financial development in
country c. I estimate the equation:
yj,c = αc + δj + βRNDRNDj × FDc + εj,c (2)
In specification (2), all country- and industry-specific factors aﬀecting rates of entry are
removed. Thus, any policies or regulations that aﬀect entry rates at the country level are
accounted for, as are all industry-specific factors leading to entry and exit. The impact of
financial development on entry (or more broadly on any country-industry outcome variable
yj,c) is then identified by asking whether entry yj,c is particularly susceptible to financial
development in industries depending on their value of RNDj. In other words, we seek
evidence that financial development aﬀects entry, exit or innovation by asking whether there
is a significant interaction between RNDj and FDc.
Suppose that yj,c is the rate of entry in industry j, country c. If financial development
encourages entrepreneurial activity primarily in industries where RNDj is high, then we
would expect the coeﬃcient βRND on the interaction term between RNDj and FDc to
be positive. By controlling for industry and country fixed eﬀects, this should be the case
regardless of other country- or industry-specific factors that might aﬀect rates of entry. As
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in Rajan and Zingales (1998), to deal with the common problem of heteroskedasticity in
fixed eﬀect panels, we apply a White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator, which
allows the variance of the residual εj,c to vary by country and by industry (as well as by
RNDj × FDc).
A potential concern is endogeneity: if there is a lot of entry, it may be that this encourages
greater use of external credit, which is how we measure FDc. We handle this possibility in
several ways. First, we use a variety of measures of financial development FDc, including
several that are not based on financial deepening. Second, the fact that the dependent vari-
able is defined at the level of the country-industry pair (whereas financial development is
a country variable) itself should reduce the possibility of endogeneity. This is precisely the
advantage of the Rajan and Zingales (1998) diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach: all country-
specific factors aﬀecting entry are captured by the country indicator αc, and identification
depends only on industry diﬀerences in rates of entry across countries. Third, we estimate
equation (2) using instrumental variables. We use the standard set of instruments for finan-
cial development, which is legal origin — English, French, German or Scandinavian — as well
as an additional indicator variable for whether the country in question is a post-socialist
transition economy.11 We draw legal origin from the CIA World Factbook: see La Porta et
al (1998) for more on the use of the legal origin instruments.12
The maintained assumption for regression (2) is that R&D intensity is an industry char-
11We use the standard two-stage procedure, where in the first stage, we regress all exogenous variables
(including the instruments) on the interaction of R&D intensity and financial development, and then use the
predicted values from the first stage to estimate regression equation specification (2) in the second stage.
The first stage requires using the interactions of legal origin with industry measures as instruments to predict
the interaction term. Using the instruments to predict values of financial development, and then interacting
the predicted values of financial development with the industry variables in the second stage, does not yield
a consistent estimator. See Wooldridge (2002) p236 for a related discussion. It is worth noting that results
are similar without instrumental variables, except that coeﬃcients tend to be smaller.
12There is also a question as to whether R&D intensity might be determined by rates of entry (reverse
causality). The literature surveyed in Geroski (1989), Cohen and Levin (1989) and Ngai and Samaniego
(2009) argues against this, in that industry diﬀerences in R&D intensity appear largely driven by technological
diﬀerences that are exogenous to the process of entry and exit. For example, Nelson and Winter (1977) coin
the term “natural trajectories” to describe the phenomenon that “advances seem to follow advances in a
way that appears somewhat ‘inevitable’ and certainly not fine tuned to the changing demand and cost
conditions.” Consistent with this literature, the correlation between entry and R&D intensity is essentially
zero.
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acteristic the ranking of which persists across countries. For example, if in the United States
firms in Chemicals are more R&D intensive than firms in Textiles, our assumption is that
the same holds true in, say, Spain or Estonia. Cohen et al (1987) find that industry dum-
mies account for about half of the variation in R&D intensity across firms in their sample,
and Ilyina and Samaniego (2008) find that R&D intensity in manufacturing is stable across
countries when comparing diﬀerent decades, suggesting that this is a reasonable assumption.
The coeﬃcient on the interaction term between RNDj and financial development is
positive and significant — see Table 8. This is regardless of whether turnover, entry or exit
is the dependent variable in the regression. The fact that RNDj interacts with financial
development to generate diﬀerences in both entry and exit rates indicates that financial
development supports entrepreneurial activity, but also that it allocates resources away from
incumbents — as per the creative destruction hypothesis. The results are also robust to a
variety of indicators of financial development. The weakest results are those concerning the
dependent variable Exitj,c.
To get a sense of the magnitude of these coeﬃcients, consider the following example. The
country with the lowest financial development (according to the measure CREc) is Latvia
(9.1 percent of GDP), and the highest is Switzerland (177 percent). The coeﬃcients imply
that the diﬀerence in entry rates between the industries with the highest and lowest R&D
intensity in Latvia is about 3.6 percentage points smaller than in Switzerland. Since industry
rates of entry vary from 2.6 percent to 16.8 percent, this represents a substantial diﬀerence.
Table 8 also reports the results of estimating equation (2) where the dependent variable
yj,c equals innovation spending in industry j, country c. These results are strong, particu-
larly for the indicator that is adjusted by the share of innovating enterprises. Thus, financial
development is related not only to increased entry, but also to the increased replacement of
incumbents and to increased spending on innovation. Revalling that the country with the
lowest financial development is Latvia and that the highest is Switzerland, the coeﬃcients
imply that the diﬀerence in innovation spending (using INNOV ADJj,c ) between the indus-
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tries with the highest and lowest R&D intensity in Latvia is about 6.1 percentage points
smaller than in Switzerland. Since industry R&D intensity varies from 0 to 32.2 percent,
this represents a substantial diﬀerence.
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
4.2 Robustness
We have already established that the results are robust to diﬀerent measures of financial
development, diﬀerent indicators of firm turnover and diﬀerent indicators of innovation.
As mentioned earlier, Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta (2007) find that entry is disproportion-
ately sensitive to financial development in industries that are more dependent on external
finance. They use a diﬀerent data set, that only covers manufacturing and which does not
have data for exit nor innovation. We ask whether their results extend to our data set, and
whether the behavior of RNDj is due to bias due to the omission of EFDc. Since EFDj
and RNDj are positively related, we estimate
yj,c = αc + δj + βEFDEFDj × FDc + εj,c (3)
and check whether the results can be replicated using EFDj instead of RNDj.
Results are as follows — see Table 9. First, when we use the full sample that includes
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing, the coeﬃcient βEFD in equation (3) is not
significant. Second, if we restrict ourselves to only look at manufacturing industries as in
Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta (2007), we confirm their finding that entry in highly finance-
dependent manufacturing industries appears sensitive to financial development. Financial
development also has a significant impact on innovation spending in high-EFD industries.
However, coeﬃcients are all smaller than those for RNDj reported in Table 8 and, as noted,
results are not significant in the full sample of industries. We interpret these results as
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indicating that financial need alone is not suﬃcient for entrepreneurs to have problems
raising funds: financial need to finance R&D-intensive projects is critical. This is consistent
with Ilyina and Samaniego (2009), who find that R&D intensity and EFDj are strongly
related at the firm level, and also that R&D intensity is related to measures of the inability
to raise funds (particularly asymmetric information and asset intangibility indicators, which
may aﬀect the firm’s ability to raise funds by exacerbating principal-agent problems and by
reducing their ability to use their assets as collateral, respectively).
One feature of research intensity at the industry level is that research activity is not
smoothly distributed across industries. For example, the most research-intensive industry
(Chemicals) has a ratio of R&D spending to net sales of 32.2 percent, and the next highest
(Computers and Electronic Products) is 13.7 percent. Also, several industries have zero R&D
intensity. To ensure that the results are not driven solely by outliers and that the standard
errors are robust to skewness, I estimate several variations of the original specification. First,
I eliminate Chemicals from the list of industries. Second, I check whether the results hold
only for manufacturing, as many of the industries with zero R&D intensity are service sector
industries. Third, I estimate the original specification, with bootstrapped standard errors.
Fourth, I estimate a "median regression," where absolute deviations (rather than squared
deviations) are minimized by the estimation procedure, again with bootstrapped standard
errors. This approach weights outliers less than "least squares" methods. Table 10 shows
that the results are generally robust to all of these variations of the original specification. To
conclude, a number of standard indicators of financial development interact positively with
industry research intensity, leading to disproportionate increases in entry, exit and innovative
activity in such industries.
TABLES 9− 11 ABOUT HERE
A possibility is that financial development proxies for an unrelated (but correlated) policy.
In particular, Klapper et al (2006) find that the regulation of entry hampers firm creation.
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For the case of investment-specific technical change, Samaniego (2010) suggests that policies
that make entry costly may lead innovations to be introduced by incumbents instead of
entrants. If so, an interaction of RNDj with entry costs might carry a negative coeﬃcient
and, if entry costs are negatively correlated with financial development, the significance of
βRND may be misleading. Indeed, startup costs as measured in World Bank (2006) are
negatively related to financial development (although the relationship is only statistically
significant for ACCSc and SOPHc), indicating that financial development could potentially
be proxying for entry costs.
To check for bias due to the omission of entry costs, we estimate the following:
yj,c = αc + δj + βECRNDRNDj ×ECc + βRNDRNDj × FDc + εj,c (4)
Here, as before, yj,c is a measure of turnover or innovative activity in industry j in country
c. ECc is a measure of entry costs, and FDc is a measure of financial development. There
is a concern regarding measurement error in the policy variables FDc and ECc, so that the
variable with the strongest interaction might simply be the one that is better measured: we
account for this by instrumenting for both policy variables using legal origin, as described
earlier.
Results are reported in Table 11. Interestingly, the interaction with entry costs is indeed
negative (as expected)13 and significant at the 10 percent level or better. This suggests
that entry costs can have an independent impact on turnover in R&D intensive industries,
which would be interesting to explore further in future work. Still, the interaction of financial
development retains its significance, most clearly when innovation spending is the dependent
variable. Thus, both financial development and entry costs aﬀect the turnover dimension of
creative destruction. This suggests that the interaction of financial development with R&D
intensity is robust to several checks, but that it is best to condition on entry costs. Indeed,
13Results are not due to collinearity, as we would expect βECRND and βRND to have opposite signs: if results
were solely due to collinearity then they would have the same sign.
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the two could be related, since higher entry costs (in the form of direct costs or delays) could
increase the startup cost and hence the financial need of the entrepreneur.
4.3 Property rights and creative destruction
Financial development is viewed as being determined by "deeper" institutions that enable
assets to be used as collateral or that aid contract enforcement — see North (1984) and
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). In particular, the importance of financial development for
R&D intensive industries raises the question of whether intellectual property rights might be
important for the creative destruction eﬀects identified above.
Property rights institutions determine the extent to which entrepreneurs can control
the use and transfer of the firm’s physical or intangible assets. They may underpin finan-
cial development because agents may use productive assets as collateral, provided they can
credibly transfer those assets in the event of default. See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and
Claessens and Laeven (2003) for further discussion. In addition, even though certain intan-
gible assets may be inherently diﬃcult to collateralize, intellectual property rights may
ensure that the revenues from an intangible investment accrue ultimately to the investor.
An investment project is more valuable, and more able to raise external funds towards its
realization, when the intangibles that delimit the project (the business plan, the product,
the brand name, etc.) are less likely to be stolen or copied by competitors. Also, they might
enable the voluntary transfer of the intangible asset so it too might be used as collateral.
As a result, indicators of IPR protection might be expected to behave similarly to financial
development measures in equation 2
We study the following IPR protection indicators:
1. PTNTc: Patent enforcement. This applies to patentable (e.g. scientific) knowledge,
such as new products or processes. It is measured as in Ginatre and Park (1997), a
de jure measure of IPR intensity, as updated in 2000. See Property Rights Alliance
(2007).
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2. COPYc: copyright enforcement. It is based on the Oﬃce of the United States Trade
Representative "Special 301" watch list, reflecting piracy rates in the business software,
entertainment software, motion picture, record and music industries. We take it to
indicate the protection of organizational and marketing innovations, as well as new
products and processes where some aspect of them might require copyright — including
branding. See Property Rights Alliance (2007).
Table 12 displays the correlations between the IPR protection indicators and measures of
financial development. COPYc and PTNTc are significantly positively correlated. However,
COPYc is also strongly correlated with the financial development measures, whereas PTNTc
is much less so. This suggests that "soft" IPR protection is more likely to underpin financial
development than is the protection of more scientific IPRs. This may be intuitive, consid-
ering that patents are much more likely to protect intellectual property in some industries
(e.g. Chemicals) than in others (e.g. Restaurants), whereas copyright enforcement protects
intangibles across the board.
We estimate the following equation:
yj,c = αc + δj + βIPRRNDRNDj × IPRc + βRNDRNDj × FDc + εj,c (5)
Here, as before, yj,c is a measure of turnover or innovative activity in industry j in country
c. IPRc is a measure of IPR protection, and FDc is the credit-to-GDP ratio. We first ask
whether there is evidence that IPRs might in fact underpin financial development. We esti-
mate (5) using instrumental variables, which is important since IPRc and FDc are possibly
subject to measurement error. The instrumental variables procedure guarantees consistency
provided the legal origin variables are an adequate instrument for these instututions. We
use the credit-to-GDP ratio as a measure of FDc: however, results are similar using other
measures of FDc.
Results are reported in Table 13, assuming that the coeﬃcient on the financial develop-
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ment interaction βRND is zero. Results allowing βRND 6= 0 are also reported in Table 13.
We find that an interaction of R&D intensity and IPR strength behaves much the same as
the interaction of R&D intensity and financial development, although this depends on the
measure of IPRs used. We find that both PTNTc and COPYc behave much the same way as
financial development when βRND = 0 and the dependent variable is firm turnover. More-
over, when we allow βRND 6= 0, the estimate for βRND is not statistically significant. This
supports the hypothesis that property rights underpin financial development — in particular,
that they help to direct financing towards entrepreneurs in research-intensive industries.
However, when the dependent variable in (5) is innovation spending, we find that the
same holds only for COPYc. In other words it appears that, when it comes to encouraging
innovation spending, "soft" intellectual property rights are more important than IPRs related
to patenting. This could reflect the fact that patenting activity is typically concentrated in
certain industries, whereas the IPRs covered by copyright law aﬀect all types of products and
services. Alternatively, it could simply be that there is not as much cross-country variation in
patent enforcement as in "soft" IPR enforcement.14 Notably, when we include an interaction
of R&D intensity with entry costs along with the interaction RNDj × IPRc, the entry cost
interaction is no longer significant even when the dependent variable yj,c is industry turnover
when we use COPYc as an indicator of IPR protection.
TABLES 12− 14 ABOUT HERE
As a matter of robustness, we check whether this relationship survives the inclusion of
an interaction between RNDj and entry costs. Table 14 reports that the significance of
the IPR interactions is maintained and, moreover, that entry cost interactions are no longer
significant in any of the regressions in which they are matched up against an interaction of
14This finding could explain why R&D intensive industries are not necessarily industries with high rates
of entry and exit in financially developed economies: to the extent that these are also economies with strong
IPRs, the inventor and the developer need not be the same person, as suggested by Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006).
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RNDj and COPYc (again, results are instrumented using legal origin variables, to correct
for possible measurement error).
Finally, we have seen that financial development, and IPR protection, appear to en-
courage both more turnover and more innovation spending particularly in R&D intensive
industries. However, it is worth asking whether there are any signs that this has an impact
on "real" outcomes. Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that high-EFD manufacturing industries
grow disproportionately faster in financially developed economies, and Ilyina and Samaniego
(2008) find that the same is the case for R&D-intensive industries. This suggests that the
considerations in this paper may have an impact on economic growth. Eurostat also reports
the growth in value added for each country-industry pair, and we ask whether this is the
case by estimating equation (2) with industry growth as the dependent variable yj,c (as in
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Ilyina and Samaniego (2008)). We did not find a significant
interaction for the measures of financial development, nor for PTNTc, although all interac-
tion coeﬃcients were positive. However, when COPYc was used as a measure of financial
development, there was a statistically significant interaction of 1.01∗∗ (s.d. 0.143).
Thus, to sum up the results of the paper, the data indicate that IPR protection promotes
growth by enabling entrepreneurs to raise the funds necessary to implement innovations.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper asks whether there is an impact of financial development upon entry, exit and
innovation spending, and whether this impact might be diﬀerent across industries depending
on their intrinsic R&D intensity. Combined with survey data on the diﬃculties experienced
by entrepreneurs attempting to innovate, the results provide direct evidence tying financial
markets to entrepreneurial and innovative activity. Moreover, they suggest that intellectual
property rights enforcement plays a key role in supporting this function of financial devel-
opment, possibly by enabling trust between entrepreneurs and their partners — including
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financiers themselves.
Note that it need not be that entrepreneurs in the least financially developed economies
are creating new-to-the-world innovations.15 Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that a signif-
icant function of R&D is to implement innovations developed at other firms, and Branstetter
et al (2006) find evidence that multinationals increase technology transfer in response to IPR
reform. Thus, the results indicate that IPR protection encourages the financing of R&D to
implement innovations regardless of whether they are new-to-the-world or whether they are
developed elsewhere.
We conclude with a brief discussion of these results in light of theoretical work on intel-
lectual property rights (IPRs).
Anton and Yao (1994, 2005) present several papers on the subject of appropriating rents
in environments with weak IPRs. Anton and Yao (1994) discuss a model in which the
developer of an innovation knows more about its quality than potential buyers: this asym-
metric information problem could be surmounted by revealing the idea to the buyer, but in
the absence of IPRs the buyer could then implement the idea without paying: information
revelation leads to expropriation. They find that even in the absence of IPRs the seller
can appropriate some of the rents from the innovation by credibly threatening to create a
duopoly, e.g. by threatening to sell the idea to another potential buyer. Anton and Yao
(2005) extend this model by allowing the seller to separately reveal a "portion" β of their
idea, over which they have tightly defined intellectual property rights. They show that a
sequential game in which portion β is revealed first and the remainder is then auctioned
is better for the developer than the strategy of selling the entire idea at once. Moreover —
although the authors did not emphasize this — the payoﬀ to the developer is increasing in
β. If we interpret β as being determined by IPR protection, and if we view the seller as an
entrant who might sell the rights to the idea as a way of raising funds to implement it,16
15Eaton and Kortum (2001) argue that most innovations originate in a handful of highly-industrialized
countries. Of course, there are well-known exceptions e.g. Skype, which was developed in Estonia.
16This is especially relevant if we interpret the "sale" as the terms of a partnership.
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then we see that more funds can be raised (and appropriated) by an innovative entrant in
the presence of strong IPR protection. One way to think of the interaction of R&D and
finance in the Anton and Yao (2005) context is to consider that R&D intensive industries
produce (and disproportionately rely on) intangible assets,17 which are more easily expropri-
ated than tangible assets. Thus, a larger β might disproportionately help technology transfer
in research intensive industries.
Another useful model for understanding our results is proposed by Biasi and Perotti
(2008). In their model, entrepreneurs require the evaluation of diﬀerent dimensions of their
projects by "experts".18 Evaluation requires revealing the idea to the expert, which raises
a risk of intellectual property theft as in Anton and Yao (1994). While the identity of
the experts is not important for their model, at least two dimensions along which many
projects need to be evaluated are (a) the scientific or engineering soundness of the underlying
innovation and (b) the financial viability of the project. Nanda (2008) finds evidence that
externally financed projects tend to be more profitable than internally financed projects,
indicating that financiers could themselves be considered a type of "expert" whose financial
know-how is critical to evaluating the viability of an innovation. Thus, for simplicity we
can think of two dimensions along which the entrepreneur requires signals as "science" and
"finance."
The key is that projects may not be realized in equilibrium because the experts face a
strong temptation to steal the idea — something we could think of as "weak IPR protection."
If R&D intensive industries are those in which expert evaluation is the most critical (for
example, they are those in which projects depend critically on a "science" signal), then a
prediction of the Biasi and Perotti (2008) model is that entry would be suppressed by weak
IPR protection — as found in this paper. A consequence of weak IPR protection would
be a lack of externally financed projects, and hence less measured credit, leading standard
17See Hall (2005) and Ilyina and Samaniego (2008, 2009).
18This is consistent with the evidence in Lazear (2004, 2005) that entrepreneurs are mostly generalists
rather than specialists.
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measures of financial development such as the credit-to-GDP ratio or market capitalization
dividied by GDP to ultimately proxy for IPR protection.
Ueda (2004) has a similar model in which the entrepreneur’s problem is whether to
finance through a venture capitalist or a bank. Only the entrepreneur knows the quality
of the project, and the venture capitalist has a better ability to evaluate the project than
the bank. Thus, contracting with venture capitalists is more eﬃcient. The problem is that
the venture capitalist may expropriate the idea and implement it herself (or at another firm
managed by the venture capitalist). Ueda (2004) shows that this becomes harder if IPR
enforcement is better, so that more projects are handled by the venture capitalist. If it is
easier to expropriate the idea in more R&D-intensive industries, and if this ability is sensitive
to IPR enforcement, then IPRs may enable the more eﬃcient handling of ideas (and, in a
general equilibrium world, may encourage their creation).
Finally, Frantzeskakis and Ueda (2007) develop a model which distinguishes explicitly
between incumbents and entrants. They develop a model with a transaction cost for trans-
ferring knowlege, which we could think of as costs imposed by an ineﬃcient IPR protection
regime. Entrants develop ideas and then find out whether they can successfully implement
them or not — which also becomes a signal about their future prospects. Thus, entry is a
form of experimentation, whereas established firms already know which ideas they are ca-
pable of implementing, and they can thus buy the ideas of entrants who are less suited for
implementation. They find that with low transaction costs in the market for intellectual
property, incumbents innovate less relative to entrants but introduce (i.e. purchase) more
innovations relative to entrants — because the cost of passing the idea from an unsuccessful
entrant to an incumbent is lower (as suggested by Cagetti and De Nardi (2005)). In an envi-
ronment of strong IPRs, in which it is less costly to transact intellectual property, entrants
are both more able to introduce innovations themselves, and also more able to enter and sell
innovations to pre-existing firms. This is consistent with the finding in Section 3 that in less
financially developed economies entrepreneurs are more likely to report the dominance of an
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incumbent as an obstacle to innovation — the same applies to the ease of finding partners
for innovation. Again, to the extent that IPR protection encourages entry (and the R&D
required for entry), we would expect greater financial deepening in such an economy.
The surveyed papers are developed in partial equilibrium. In particular, they are gener-
ally models of entry which abstract from exit — which is both essential to general equilibrium
and to the creative destruction concept. Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop a model of
growth through entry by innovators, and Aghion et al (2005) extend the model to incorpo-
rate credit constraints. In turn, Ilyina and Samaniego (2009) extend their framework to a
multi-industry context. However, these two models are geared towards generating predic-
tions for growth, and have no predictions for entry and exit — nor do they have an explicit
notion of intellectual property rights. The results of this paper suggest that the general equi-
librium modeling of the interaction of R&D and finance through IPR enforcement remains
a fruitful direction for future research.
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Country Turnover Entry Exit InnovRAW InnovADJ
Belgium 14.5 7.0 7.5 2.7 1.4
Bulgaria 19.8 10.4 9.4 2.1 0.3
Czech Rep. 18.1 9.3 8.8 3.5 1.3
Denmark 15.0 7.7 7.3 3.5 1.8
Germany - - - 3.3 2.1
Estonia 19.1 10.5 8.6 2.4 1.2
Ireland - - - 2.4 1.5
Greece - - - 6.2 2.2
Spain 14.6 8.6 6.0 1.5 0.5
France 12.8 7.2 5.6 3.3 1.1
Italy 14.0 7.6 6.4 2.8 1.0
Cyprus - 4.1 - 4.0 1.8
Latvia 21.6 13.6 8.0 - -
Lithuania 20.0 11.9 8.1 2.5 0.7
Luxembourg 16.4 9.6 6.8 2.2 1.1
Hungary 18.2 10.0 8.2 2.3 0.5
Malta - - - 1.7 0.4
Netherl. 16.2 8.4 8.2 2.0 0.7
Poland - - - 2.6 0.7
Portugal 15.3 8.8 6.5 2.1 0.9
Romania 25.3 16.9 8.4 3.4 0.7
Slovenia 13.5 8.0 5.5 - -
Slovakia 17.4 9.5 7.9 3.2 0.7
Finland 13.1 7.0 6.1 - -
Sweden 10.9 6.0 4.9 4.7 2.4
UK 21.6 11.1 9.5 - -
Norway 18.4 10.6 7.8 1.8 0.7
Switzerland 7.3 3.5 3.8 - -
Table 1 — Summary statistics: Average annual
rates of turnover across countries. Source — Eurostat.
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Table 2 — Summary statistics: annual industry rates of R&D intensity and
turnover. R&D intensity is the median ratio of R&D spending to sales. Entry,
exit and turnover are industry fixed eﬀects plus the median country fixed
eﬀect. All variables are measured over the period 1997-2006.
Sources — Eurostat, Compustat.
36
Industry indicator
Entry Exit RND EFD
Turnover 0.97
∗∗∗
0.90
∗∗∗
-0.15 0.134
(0.042) (0.071) (0.158) (0.160)
Entry - 0.75
∗∗∗
-0.11 0.160
(0.106) (0.159) (0.160)
Exit - - -0.18 0.075
(0.158) (0.160)
RND 0.78∗∗∗
(0.107)
Table 3 — Cross-industry correlations between
turnover measures and industry variables. Rates of
turnover, entry and exit are based on industry fixed
eﬀects δj in equation (1) . Standard errors
are in parentheses. In all tables, one, two and three
asterisks represent significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels respectively.
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Financial Development
CAP BANK MARG ACCS SOPH
CRE 0.90
∗∗∗
0.57
∗∗∗
.57∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗ .56∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (.027) (.002)
CAP - 0.49
∗∗∗
.54∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ .65∗∗∗
(.008) (.003) (.003) (.000)
BANK - - .75∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗ .57∗∗∗
(.000) (.016) (.002)
MARG - - - 0.50∗∗∗ .62∗∗∗
(.006) (.000)
ACCS - - - - .91∗∗∗
(.000)
Table 4 — Cross-country correlations between
measures of financial development. P-values are
in parentheses.
Sources of Financial Development
finance CRE CAP BANK MARG ACCS SOPH
Own funds .34 .32 .44 .08 -.01 -.00
Family funds -.55∗∗ -.66∗∗∗ -.72∗∗∗ -.54∗∗ -.77∗∗∗ -.79∗∗∗
Collateralized loans .43 .56∗∗ .28 .48∗ .56∗∗ .51∗
Non-coll loans .17 .15 .13 .15 .42 .50∗
Venture capital -.33 -.28 -.39 -.00 -.17 -.17
Other Enterprises .28 .64∗∗ .28 .34 .52∗ .346
Public funds .26 .34 .48∗ .42 .36 .42
Table 5 — Correlations between significant sources of financing for startups
and financial development measures. P-values are in brackets.
Source — Eurostat Survey on Factors of Business Success, 2007.
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Survey Financial Development
question CRE CAP BANK MARG ACCS SOPH
Is loan repayment 0.67*** 0.55** 0.77*** 0.81*** 0.36 0.49*
a priority?
Was the firm born 0.29 0.33 0.65** 0.63** 0.49* 0.52*
to implement innov.?
Table 6 — Highest priority if earnings increase.
dominant incumbent. P-values are in parentheses.
Source — Authors calculations and the Eurostat survey on Factors
of Business Success, 2007.
Limitations on Financial Development
innovation CRE CAP BANK MARG ACCS SOPH
Own funds -.32 -.36∗ .04 .08 -.30 -.30
External funds -.62∗∗∗ -.53∗∗∗ -.48∗∗ -.62∗∗∗ -.77∗∗∗ -.60∗∗∗
Innovation costs -.55∗∗∗ -.28 -.29 -.41∗∗ -.59∗∗∗ -.60∗∗∗
Qualif. personnel -.26 -.27 -.01 -.08 -.22 -.19
IT adoption -.20 -.25 -.16 -.08 -.23 -.21
Market info -.17 -.16 .00 .13 -.10 -.12
Partners -.49∗∗ -.43∗∗ -.33 -.32 -.50∗∗∗ -.46∗∗
Dom. incumb. -.65∗∗∗ -.56∗∗∗ -.24 -.38∗ -.53∗∗∗ -.52∗∗∗
Table 7 — Correlations between reported significant diﬃculties
in financing innovation among firms and financial development
measures. Answers include (1) lack of own funds (2) diﬃculty of
raising external funds (3) high costs of innovation (4) diﬃculty of
finding qualified personnel (5) diﬃculty of adopting information
technology (6) lack of information about market conditions
(7) diﬃculty of finding partners for innovation (8) presence of a
dominant incumbent. P-values are in parentheses.
Source — Authors calculations and the Eurostat survey on Factors
of Business Success, 2007.
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Dependent variable yj,c
Turnover Entry Exit InnovADJ InnovRAW
FDc βRND R2 βRND R2 βRND R2 βRND R2 βRND R2
CRE 0.33*** .652 0.19** .640 0.13** .538 .56∗∗∗ .602 1.58∗∗∗ .658
(.115) (.095) (.056) (0.150) (.578)
CAP 0.29∗∗ .652 0.17∗ .640 0.12∗ .538 .83∗∗∗ .608 2.13∗∗ .654
(.125) (.100) (.057) (0.219) (.760)
BANK 0.51∗∗ .649 0.31* .638 0.18* .535 .52∗∗∗ .586 1.34∗∗ .636
(.232) (.160) (.103) (.179) (.525)
MARG 0.45∗∗∗ .651 0.27∗∗ .640 0.17* .536 .57∗∗ .580 1.31∗∗ .634
(0.180) (0.119) (0.100) (.248) (.579)
ACCS 0.46∗∗∗ .654 0.30∗∗∗ .642 0.16∗∗∗ .539 .63∗∗∗ .588 1.33∗∗∗ .639
(0.129) (0.091) (0.061) (.183) (.439)
SOPH 0.44∗∗∗ .653 0.27∗∗∗ .641 0.16∗∗ .538 .70∗∗∗ .603 1.63∗∗∗ .648
(0.137) (0.099) (0.066) (.164) (.492)
Table 8 — Eﬀect on turnover, entry and exit of the interaction between
R&D intensity and financial development, based on estimating equation (2) .
Country and industry fixed eﬀects are omitted for brevity. Heteroskedasticity
-corrected standard errors are reported in brackets. R&D intensity is
measured as the ratio of research spending to net sales at the median firm
in Compustat (RND). The measure of financial development is the private
credit-to-GDP ratio (CRE). Financial development is instrumented using legal
origin. Observations for turnover, entry and exit are 869, 916 and 875 respectively.
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Dependent variable yj,c
Turnover Entry Exit InnovADJ InnovRAW
βEFD R2 βEFD R2 βEFD R2 βEFD R2 βEFD R2
0.24** .604 0.15 .571 0.09 .498 .41∗∗∗ .403 1.48∗∗ .304
(.121) (.114) (.060) (0.136) (.679)
Table 9 — Eﬀect on turnover, entry and exit of the interaction between EFD and
financial development, based on estimating equation (3) . Country and industry fixed
eﬀects are omitted for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Results are for manufacturing only. The measure of financial development
is the private credit-to-GDP ratio (CRE). Financial development is instrumented using
legal origin. Observations for turnover, entry and exit are 869, 916 and 875 respectively.
Dependent variable yj,c
Specification Turnover Entry Exit InnovRAW InnovADJ
Without .62*** .28* .31*** 2.03** 1.00***
chemicals (.224) (.163) (.103) (.833) (.340)
Manuf .24** .17* .06 1.24** .358***
only (.112) (.098) (.057) (.592) (.119)
Bootstrapped .33*** .19* .13** 1.58*** .563***
standard (.094) (.102) (.059) (.461) (.172)
errors
Median .270*** .160** .073** .404*** .142*
regression (.104) (.081) (.037) (.113) (.086)
(bootstrapped)
Table 10 — Eﬀect on turnover of the interaction between financial development,
based on estimating equation (2) . Robustness exercises. The results use
the credit-to GDP ratio as a measure of financial development. In the first two
specifications financial development is instrumented using legal origin.
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Dependent variable yj,c
Turnover InnovADJ
FDc βECRND βRND β
EC
RND βRND
CRE -.85*** .34*** -.76** .65***
(.292) (.133) (.346) (.199)
CAP -.74*** .25* -.49* .81***
(.284) (.129) (.279) (.245)
BANK -.73** .45** -.88*** .67***
(.289) (.213) (.320) (.225)
MARG -.65** .37** -.59* .59**
(.281) (.156) (.341) (.240)
ACCS .13 .51 .59 .88***
(.670) (.317) (.442) (.259)
SOPH -.31 .33 .057 .71***
(.461) (.225) (.311) (.180)
Table 11 — Eﬀect on turnover and innovation of the interaction between
R&D intensity and entry costs, based on estimating equation (4) .
Measures of Financial Development
IPR protection CRE CAP BANK MARG ACCS SOPH COPY
PTNT -.11 .02 .06 .16 .10 .16 .45**
COPY .63*** .71*** .61*** .63*** .71*** .81*** -
Table 12 — Cross country correlations between measures of financial
development and IPR protection.
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Dependent variable yj,c
Turnover InnovADJ
IPRc βIPRRND βRND Obs R2 β
IPR
RND βRND Obs R2
PTNT 1.27*** - 746 .666 -0.21 - 495 .597
(.397) (.144)
1.24*** 0.28 746 .667 -0.41 0.58*** 495 .603
(.370) (.198) (.149) (.152)
COPY .500∗∗∗ - 869 .655 .601∗∗∗ - 519 .618
(.115) (.135)
.455∗∗∗ .127 869 .655 .449∗∗ .236 519 .616
(.117) (.130) (.205) (.253)
Table 13 — Eﬀect on turnover and innovation of the interaction between
R&D intensity and indicators of IPRs, based on estimating equation (5) .
Results are reported both imposing and relaxing the assumption that βRND
is zero. The measure of financial development is CRE; results are similar
using other measures of financial development.
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Dependent variable yj,c
Turnover InnovADJ
IPRc βECRND β
IPR
RND β
EC
RND β
IPR
RND
PTNT -.44 1.10*** -.58** .07
(.342) (.373) (.257) (.330)
COPY -.29 .44*** -.32 .57***
(.299) (.122) (.288) (.135)
Table 14 — Eﬀect on turnover and innovation of the interaction between
R&D intensity and indicators of IPRs, based on estimating equation (5)
but including an interaction of R&D intensity with entry costs instead of FDc
and entry costs.
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Figure 1 — Significant sources of finance for startups. The y-axis
reports the share of startups reporting each factor as a significant
source of finance. Responses include (1) own funds (2) family
members (3) bank loan with collateral (4) bank loan without
collateral (5) venture capital (6) other enterprises. Source —
Eurostat survey on Factors of Business Success, 2007.
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Figure 2 — Factors hampering innovation. Answers include:
lack of own funds; diﬃculty of raising external funds; high
costs of innovation; diﬃculty of finding qualified personnel;
diﬃculty of adopting information technology; lack of information
about the market; diﬃculty of finding partners for innovation;
presence of established enterprises. Source — Author’s calculations
and the Eurostat survey on Factors of Business Success, 2007.
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